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Virtual Ethics: From the viewpoint of Song and Mingru
Author: Huang Yong
Source: “Sichuan Major” (Philosophy and Social Science Edition) 2020 Issue 5
【Author of this article】
Huang Yong, Ph.D. in philosophy in Sudan, and Ph.D. in Religion at Harvard. He is currently a professor and director of the Department of Chinese Philosophy in Drumbi Hong Kong. He has taught at American for a long time and also served as the Co-operative Director of the Confucian Traditional Group of the American Religious Society, the Co-operative Director of the Song and Ming Confucian Discussion Class of Colombia, and the Chairman of the North American Chinese Philosopher Association. He has created and directed the English academic journal Dao:A Journal of Comparative Philosophy and the academic journal Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy, and has served as the editor of nearly 20 Chinese and English academic journals and books. In addition to more than 80 academic essays in Chinese and English, he published English works, gious Goodness and Political Rightness, Confucius and Why Be Moral, as well as his Chinese books “The Ethics of the Age of Globalization”, “Religion in the Age of Globalization”, “Politics in the Age of Globalization” and “Contemporary Virtue Ethics: The Contributions of Modern Confucianism”. Today, we are completing two English manuscripts, Ethics of Difference: Learning from the Daoist Zhuangzi and Knowing-to: Wang Yangming’s Contributions to Contemporary Moral Philosophy.
【Abstract】
When looking at Confucianism in Song and Ming dynasties from the perspective of virtue ethics, we try to see the latter as a kind of virtue ethics differences. From the perspective of Song and Ming dynasties, the important thing is to look at the shortcomings, limitations and problems in virtue ethics. The Confucianism in Song and Ming dynasties, especially the Second Cheng, Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming, can make a difference in fighting these shortcomings and fighting these limitations. Although this research on inclusiveness is also a comparative philosophy in broad terms, it is not a comparison of the completed system of virtue ethics, but promotes the development of virtue ethics itself in comparison, which is not a patent for certain ethics in Eastern history (not actually in Chinese history). In this meaning, look at virtue and ethics from the perspectives of Song and Ming ConfucianismLearning is not about using the information of Song and Ming Confucianism to solve the problem of Eastern virtue ethics, because this statement implies that these problems are not about Song and Ming Confucianism, Confucianism and even Chinese philosophy itself. Song Mingru can solve these problems of virtue ethics that Eastern philosophers have not or even cannot solve. They confess their own feelings to the Confucianism of Song Mingru, Confucianism and even the entire Chinese philosopher.
【Keywords】
The School of Virtue Ethics; Confucianism; Ercheng; Zhu Xi; Wang Yangming
The article is named “Virtue Ethics: From the View of Confucianism in Song and Ming Dynasty”, rather than “Song and Ming Dynasty Confucianism in Song and Ming Dynasty: From the View of Confucianism in Song and Ming Dynasty”, which is interesting. I would like to express this to express that virtue ethics is a neutral concept. You can look at the perspective of Aristotle, from the perspective of the unspoken theory, or from the perspective of Confucianism, especially the perspective of Song and Ming Confucianism. Of course, you can also look at the perspective of many other perspectives. In other words, if you want to understand the moral theory of virtue, you can read Aristotle’s works, Yu Ting’s works, Confucianism, including Confucianism, and of course you can read many other works. That is to say, virtue ethics is not the right to a particular historical form of virtue ethics (such as the Aristotleian theory of virtue ethics). Otherwise, this article also confesses that the title of this article is not to evaluate the Confucianism of Song and Ming from the perspective of virtue ethics, but to prove that the Confucianism of the Ming Dynasty is also a kind of virtue ethics. On the contrary, what this article needs to do is to evaluate the moral ethics from the perspective of Confucianism in Song and Ming dynasties. Although it is not to prove that moral ethics is also a kind of Confucianism in Song and Ming dynasties, it is indeed to prove that the morale of Confucianism in Song and Ming dynasties can make contributions to the development of morale. Although virtue ethics has gained great rejuvenation in contemporary Oriental and has become a powerless challenger in the mainstream theory and consequences of Oriental ethics since modern times, it is not only often criticized by the latter, but also has various shortcomings in itself. For the former, it requires appropriate responses, and for the latter, it requires creative modifications and development, and Song Mingru could make contributions in both aspects. The discussion in this article will be centered on the second Cheng, Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming. [1]
The contribution of the first and second Chengs to contemporary virtue ethics
Regarding the contribution of the second Chengs to contemporary virtue ethics, we can first take a look at the dispute between the two important factions of contemporary virtue ethics, namely the sensualism and emotionalism, and explain how Cheng’s virtue ethics can help us beyond the dispute between these two factions. In the rejuvenation movement of contemporary virtue ethics, Aristotle’s theory was mainstream. It is a sensualist virtue ethics, not only because it regards sensibility as a unique will for man, but also because it attempts to make a sensual description of what virtue is: virtue is the quality that leads to man’s prosperity or happiness (eudaimonia). Ethics of the sensualismOne of the problems is that after making such explanations, virtue is no longer important, but has become a concept of prosperity or happiness from people, and in this way, whether this ethics can still be morally ethics become a problem. In contrast to this structure is the slander in the contemporary rejuvenation movement of virtue ethics. It is a kind of virtue ethics of emotionalism, not only because it acts as virtue is a feeling like love, care, especially empathy, and because it rejects the explanation of why such feelings are virtues for a sensuality, From this, the master directly understands that such feelings are virtues, good, or perhaps more accurately admirable; while some opposite feelings, such as hatred, indifference and insensibility, are deplorable, which is evil and evil. But a virtue ethics does not tell people what virtue is always a disadvantage.
The most important representative of this emotional theory is Michael Slote. He believed that empathy was the most important virtue of the moral theory of emotional theory. When explaining this virtue, he specifically mentioned that the Chinese philosopher Cheng Jun is the earliest sympathetic philosopher we know so far, because Cheng Jun said that the physical sense of everything that a benevolent person has is actually the same. The master understood that when Cheng Jun explained the most important virtue of Confucianism, he compared the doctor’s “unkindness” category: “Doctors think that it is unkindness, and people think that it is unkindness without knowing and not knowing and not knowing and not knowing and not benevolent, just like it.” [2] On the contrary, the benevolence that doctors say is to be able to understand its own pain, and benevolence as Confucian virtue is to be able to continuously expand this ability to know and pain, and always expand the scope of what can be regarded as part of one’s body. So, for Cheng Jun, thinking that being one with something is that one can feel the pain of the thing. I can feel the pain in my feet, just tell my feet to me, I can feel the pain in my parents, I can feel the pain in my parents, I can feel the pain in my feet, just tell me to me as a whole. Of course, if a person feels that there is pain in a certain part of his body (and a kind person regards all things as a part of his body), he will definitely naturally eliminate this pain. In this meaning, Cheng Han’s whole view is very different from Slot’s emotional theory and virtue ethics. In contrast, Slott replaced the sensible virtue ethics with his emotional virtue ethics, but in Cheng Zhang’s case, this emotional virtue ethics is different from the sensible virtue ethics. The key is that although the sense of empathy is that the sense of unity of all objects as a virtue occupies a focus in Cheng’s philosophy, Cheng’s explanation as virtue: empathy is the most important expression of benevolence in Confucian tradition, and benevolence is what stipulates that people are human; in other words, to become a person, one must be benevolence, and benevolence can take all objects as one. More importantly, Cheng Jun used it to explain the humanitarian concept of Ren’s virtueHe is composed of benevolence, and this explanation adheres to the importance of benevolence in his ethics, so his ethics is a virtue ethics. It is precisely in this meaning that I believe that Cheng Hanyu’s virtue ethics has neither an emotional component nor an emotional component, which goes beyond the conflict between the internal sensualism and emotionalism of virtue ethics.
As for the second contribution of Erche
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